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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a tractable model where both socialization (or network
formation) and productive eﬀorts can be analyzed simultaneously. This permits a full-ﬂedged
equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous productive eﬀorts and het-
erogeneous agents. We show that there exist two stable interior equilibria, which we can Pareto
rank. The socially eﬃcient outcome lies between these two equilibria. When the intrinsic returns
to production and socialization increase, all equilibrium actions decrease at the Pareto-superior
equilibrium, while they increase at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. In both cases, the percentage
change in socialization eﬀort is higher (in absolute value) than that of the productive eﬀort.
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11 Introduction
Social interactions are an important aspect of everyday’s life. For example, ﬁrms interact with other
ﬁrms to exchange information about new technologies, individuals meet friends and researchers go
to workshops and conferences. In the economics literature, social interactions are often related to
particular forms of externalities, in which the actions of a reference group aﬀect an individual’s
utility. The reference group depends on the context, and it typically consists of an individual’s
family, neighbors, friends or peers. Social interactions are sometimes called non-market interactions
to emphasize the fact that these interactions are not regulated by the price mechanism (see, in
particular, Scheinkman, 2008). As pointed out by Becker (1974) and recently emphasized by the
literature on social capital,1 social interactions have a crucial importance in the determination of
an individual’s outcomes and, hence, on his well-being. The aim of this paper is to investigate the
interaction between productive eﬀort and the creation of synergies in a tractable framework. We
model this interaction in a way that allows us to characterize how agents devote resources to both
activities optimally. In turn, this permits a full-ﬂedged equilibrium/welfare analysis of individual
decisions and to derive unambiguous comparative statics results. Let us describe in more detail our
model.
The environment Our model has two main ingredients.
First, we consider a model with local complementarities in productive investment. More pre-
cisely, spillovers are generated by paired agents and are multiplicative in own’s and other’s pro-
ductive eﬀort. We allow for two diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity. On the one hand, agents can
diﬀer in their marginal returns to own productive eﬀort. On the other hand, for identical levels of
productive eﬀorts, spillovers can vary with the strength of the synergistic linkage across diﬀerent
pairs of agents. It turns out that this payoﬀ structure allows to exactly pin down how the level of
productive eﬀort varies with the pattern of external eﬀects exerted on each individual, and with
the idiosyncratic characteristics of the agents.
Second, we assume that agents devote a (joint) amount of resources to building synergies with
others. The collection of socialization eﬀorts determines the meeting possibilities across pairs of
agents and results in a pattern of, possibly heterogeneous, bilateral interactions. The intensity of
each bilateral interaction which results from this socialization process becomes a scaling factor on
the local production complementarities arising between these two agents.
An innovation of our study is, precisely, that the synergistic eﬀort is generic within a community
−a scalar decision. Socializing is not equivalent, in our approach, to elaborating a nominal list of
intended relationships, as in the literature on network formation surveyed by Jackson (2009).2 In
1Coleman (1990) and Putnam (2000) are standard references. Sobel (2002) and Durlauf (2002) oﬀer critical
surveys of this literature.
2We discuss the relationship between our model and this literature below.
2other words, network formation is not the result of an earmarked socialization process.
This is realistic in many applications, particularly when networks are so large that keeping
track of every participant becomes a burdensome task, or when the individuals do not yet know
one another. For example, businessmen go to fairs, and researchers to conferences and workshops to
present their ideas or products, to listen to those of other people’s, and to meet peers in general. In
order to motivate the model and to better understand its empirical implications, we provide a very
concrete example of a situation captured by the model. Then, we discuss all notions and results
of our paper through the lens of this example. The example is as follows. The decision makers in
the model are parents. Each parent is altruistic and cares about the future educational outcome of
his child. Each parent exerts two types of costly eﬀort: productive eﬀort with the child (i.e. doing
homework with the child, doing sport activities together, driving him to diﬀerent activities, and
so on) and socialization eﬀort related to education (going to parental evenings, birthday parties,
or any activity that involves other parents). In this example, each parent does not directly decide
with whom he interacts, but rather participates in parental activities (parental evenings, birthday
parties) which can eventually lead to social interactions with other parents. These activities provide
valuable information about parenting techniques, reading or study materials, school conditions
and other important educational inputs. As a result of these activities, some parental and child
friendships are created, which then continue producing synergies, and further directed socialization
over time. For those relationships, which also have important educational implications, ours can
be seen as a model of how they are created.
Our choice of a model without earmarked socialization greatly improves the tractability of the
analysis. Unlike with richer models of link formation, we can resort to oﬀ-the-shelf Nash equilibrium
analysis without being burdened by the extreme (combinatorial) multiplicity problems of the other
models.3 As a result, we can perform a standard type of equilibrium analysis that equates marginal
costs and beneﬁts of both production and socialization. Of course, this equilibrium characterization
also greatly simpliﬁes welfare and comparative statics analyses.
Results We characterize the equilibria of the model when agents take their decision about
their productive eﬀort and their socialization eﬀort simultaneously. We show that there are two
interior equilibria and one (partially) corner equilibrium, when a suﬃciently large number of in-
dividuals is implicated. The (partially) corner equilibrium where agents do not invest at all in
3In a typical game of network formation, players simultaneously announce all the links they wish to form with. The
links that form are those that are mutually announced by both partners. The cost of creating and maintaining links
are then paid. As a consequence of the large multi-dimensional strategy space, and because link creation requires the
mutual consent of the two parties involved, a severe coordination problem arises. As such, the game often displays a
multiplicity of Nash equilibria, and very diﬀerent network geometries can arise endogenously. A partial solution to
this problem can be found by allowing pair-wise or coalitional deviations, or by restricting to cooperative-like network
stability notions (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Jackson (2009) surveys this literature, while Calvó-Armengol and
Ilkiliç (2009) derive the connections between this approach and standard game-theoretic reﬁnements.
3building synergies is unstable. Instead, the two interior equilibria are stable. Existence and stabil-
ity of interior equilibria are obtained when the level of cross synergies as well as the heterogeneity
in individual traits are not too large, which amounts to bounding from above a compound index of
both payoﬀ parameters.
For large enough populations, equilibrium actions take a particularly simple form. Recall that
agents can display diﬀerent marginal returns to own productive eﬀort. We label “individual type”
the value of this marginal return at the origin. We ﬁrst show that the ratios of productive as well
as socialization eﬀorts across diﬀerent pairs of agents are all equal to the ratio of their individual
types. In other words, at equilibrium, the productive and socialization eﬀorts for a given agent are
the product of his individual type with some baseline values for the productive and socialization
eﬀorts. These baseline values, in turn, are obtained from a system of two equations with two
unknowns that admits exactly two positive solutions −hence the two interior equilibria. Compared
to the case of an isolated agent, these baseline values are all scaled up by a synergistic multiplier,
which is homogeneous across players and which depends on a compound index of heterogeneity in
the community within which they interact.
This simple equilibrium characterization has a number of interesting implications. In particular,
we can show that one of the interior equilibria displays both higher socialization and productive
eﬀorts than the other, so that we can talk of a high-action and a low-action equilibrium. It also
turns out that the high-action equilibrium is Pareto superior. Furthermore, the socially eﬃcient
outcome lies in between the two equilibria, so that we can eﬀectively talk about a too-high and a
too-low equilibrium.
An important question is then how an exogenous change in the returns to production and
socialization aﬀect the relative production and socialization eﬀorts at equilibrium. In turns out
that, when the returns increase, all equilibrium actions decrease at the Pareto-superior equilibrium,
while they increase at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. In both cases, the percentage change in
socialization eﬀort is higher (in absolute value) than that of the productive eﬀort.
To summarize, we provide a simple operational model of network formation with welfare pre-
dictions and clear-cut comparative statics. In substance, we identify a “too cold” and a “too hot”
equilibrium. We show that socialization is more responsive than production to exogenous shocks
in the parameters.
Relation to the literature on network formation and social interactions A growing
literature over the last two decades has examined the problem of social network formation and
its implications for economic phenomena. With respect to this literature (for literature surveys,
see Vega-Redondo, 2007; Goyal, 2008; Jackson, 2009) our model, as many others in the literature,
studies the eﬀects of social interactions via its impact on production. The novelty is that we
model socialization/network formation via a generic eﬀort variable, rather than as the result of an
4earmarked socialization process.4
One of the main objectives of the paper is to provide a tractable framework where both social-
ization (or network formation) and productive eﬀorts can be analyzed in a single model. We do
this in a context of Ballester et al. (2006) framework because this is a simple model that has nice
properties. Observe, however, that the insight of using non-directed socialization should carry over
to other types of models. Our model also diﬀers from that of Ioannides and Soetevent (2007) in
that we can characterize the exact solutions of equilibria and analyze the comparative statics and
welfare properties of our model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and introduces the baseline
game as well as the replica game. Section 3 contains the equilibrium and welfare analysis. The
comparative statics results are gathered in Section 4. Section 5 discusses some empirical implica-
tions of our model while Section 6 proposes diﬀerent speciﬁcations that generalizes our model. All
proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The game
The replica game N = {1,...,n} is a ﬁnite set of players, and T = {1,...,t} is a ﬁnite set
of types for these players. We let n be a multiple of t, that is, n = mt for some integer m ≥ 1, so
that there is the same number of players of each type.
More precisely, we refer to the case n = t as the baseline game, and to the general case n = mt
as the m−replica of this baseline game. In an m−replica game, there are exactly m players of each
type τ ∈ T. This replica game allows us to take limits as the population becomes large without
having to specify the types of the new individuals that are added.
For each player i ∈ N, we denote by τ (i) ∈ T his type.
We consider a simultaneous move game of network formation (or social interactions) and in-
vestment. The returns to the investment are the sum of a private component and a synergistic
component. The private returns are heterogeneous across players and depend on their type. We
denote by b = (b1,...,bt) the proﬁle of these private returns, where 0 < b1 ≤ b2 ≤ ... ≤ bt. Even
though each type in the replica game has the same number of individuals, we can match any ﬁnite
distribution of types in a population by adding multiple copies of an individual type.5
The synergistic returns depend on the network formed on account of individual choices, as
described below.
Network formation Consider some m−replica game, m ≥ 1. Let n = mt.
4See Bloch and Dutta (2009) for a model with endogenous link strength but in a standard framework of directed
socialization.
5With enough replications, of course.
5Each player i selects a socialization eﬀort, si ≥ 0. Let s = (s1,...,sn) be a proﬁle of socialization
eﬀorts. Then, i and j interact with a link intensity given by:
gij(s) = ρ(s)sisj (1)
By deﬁnition, links are symmetric, that is, gij = gji. We also allow for self-loops (when i = j).













j=1 sj, if s  = 0
0, if s = 0
(2)
so that gi(s) = si. That is, players decide upon their total interaction intensity.
In this model, the exact identity of the interacting partner is not an object of choice. Rather,
players choose an aggregate level of socialization eﬀort. This total eﬀort is then distributed across
each and every possible bilateral interaction in proportion to the partner’s socialization eﬀort.
This interaction pattern arises naturally when meetings result from casual encounters rather than
from an earmarked socialization process. Using the example provided in the Introduction, si is the
socialization eﬀort for parents related to education (e.g. participation in parental evenings, birthday
parties, etc.). The more parents i and j participate in common parental activities, the more likely
it is that they interact with each other. There is, quite naturally, congestion in socialization, as
captured by ρ(s).
The nature of this congestion is, of course an important part of the model, so some more
discussion is in order. Taking the parenting example, interaction in parental evenings (of which
there is a potentially unbounded number) happens in the form of conversations, which are always
pairwise. The variable si can be taken as the number of evenings a particular parent attends
(meaning that i can only devote a ﬁxed amount of time to socialization activities). At the beginning
of an evening, parents are paired at random for the duration of the event. Thus, the fraction of
nights a parent i is matched with parent j is given by ρ(s)sj and hence the total number of
nights they interact is ρ(s)sjsi. Congestion arises in this example because of the random matching
technology. The higher is the number of parents, the more diﬃcult is for a parent i to be matched
with a particular parent j.
The functional form in (1) and (2) can be tied back to simple properties of the link intensity
gij (s), as established below.
L     1 Suppose that, for all s  = 0, the link intensity satisﬁes:
(A1) symmetry: gij (s) = gji (s), for all i,j;
6(A2) aggregate constant returns to scale:
 n
j=1 gij (s) = si;
(A3) anonymous socialization: gji (s)/sj = gki (s)/sk, for all i,j,k;
then, the link intensity is given by (1) and (2).
Conditions (A2) and (A3) reﬂect the fact that i controls his total number of contacts si, but the
actual type composition of these contacts depends on others’ socialization eﬀorts. More precisely,
each player devotes the same share of his total socialization eﬀort to interacting with player i.
Investment Each player i makes a productive investment, ki ≥ 0. In our example, ki ex-
presses parent’s productive eﬀort with the child (like e.g. doing homework and driving the child to
diﬀerent activities). The choices of si and ki are simultaneous. Let k = (k1,...,kn) be a proﬁle of
investments. These individual investments yield both a private and a synergistic return.
The private returns to player i only depend on his own investment level ki and his idiosyncratic
traits, summarized by bτ(i) ≥ 0. We adopt a simple quadratic expression bτ(i) ki − ck2
i/2.
The synergistic return depends on both s and k. We consider multiplicative synergies kikj that
are additively separable across pairs of players. For each pair of players i,j, these cross eﬀects
are scaled by a factor that reﬂects the intensity of the interaction between the two players. More
precisely, we assume that:
∂2ui(s,k)
∂ki∂kj
= agij(s), for all i  = j, (3)
where a ≥ 0 corresponds to the level of synergistic returns.
Notice that the symmetry (A1) in Lemma 1 is tantamount to payoﬀs being twice continuously
diﬀerentiable in the productive investments k.
Payoﬀs Let c > 0. Player i’s utility is equal to:












Payoﬀs are a linear-quadratic function of kis with non-negative cross eﬀects (3) reﬂecting strate-
gic complementarities in productive investments. The size agij(s) ≥ 0 of these complementarities
depends on the proﬁle of socialization eﬀorts, and varies across diﬀerent pairs of players. For all
x ∈ Rt
+, deﬁne x =
 t
τ=1 xτ/t and x2 =
 t
τ=1 x2































































































Most of the interactions are positive with the exception of whether the socialization of a partic-
ular person j creates positive or negative externalities on i and whether the marginal beneﬁt of
socialization of i increases or decreases on the socialization eﬀort of j. In both cases, the eﬀect on
i depends on whether person j is making higher or lower eﬀort kj than an average of the others
(weighted by their own relative socialization eﬀort).
Let us explain this utility function in the light of our education example. The term bτ(i) ki +
a
 n





is the cost of both eﬀorts for parent i. In other words, the educational outcome of a child depends
on bτ(i), which represents either parental education or child’s own talent (for example, I.Q.), ki,
the productive eﬀort his parent is exerting in educating him, and si, the socialization eﬀort his
parent provides when participating in parental activities. The latter will help parent i to be more
productive (because of local complementarities) in educating his child. Indeed, the more a parent
participates in diﬀerent parental activities, the higher is the probability that he interacts with other
parents and the more this parent will learn from them.
This general way of modeling the utility function in the context of education is similar to others
in the literature (see, e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Patacchini and Zenou, 2010). The main novelty
here is the way in which we model socialization through gij (s) and its interaction with productive
eﬀorts ki and kj.
3 Equilibrium analysis and welfare
3.1 Equilibrium analysis





m−replica game with heterogeneous types b = (b1,...,bt), and for m large enough.6
6Instead of having a m−replica game with heterogeneous types and large population, we could have instead
considered a model with a continuum of agents and types. In that case, we would have obtained exactly the same
results, except for the fact that a(b) (deﬁned below in equation (5)) would have been an integral rather than a sum.
8Under some conditions that we provide, there are exactly three such equilibria.
In one (partially corner) equilibrium, the level of socialization eﬀort is null for all players.
Indeed, non-reciprocated unilateral socialization eﬀorts do not yield any interaction supportive of
synergies. The two other equilibria are interior.
We ﬁrst identify the (partially) corner equilibrium of the game.






for all i = 1,...,mt is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium with corresponding equilibrium payoﬀs b2
τ(i)/2c.
The intuition runs as follows. If nobody exerts any socialization eﬀort, then it is optimal
for other players not to provide a positive socialization eﬀort and thus s∗
i = 0. This is a Nash









Holding the average type
 t
τ=1 bτ/t constant, the parameter a(b) increases with the hetero-





τ=1 bτ, which many
authors refer to as the second-order average type (e.g., Vega-Redondo 2007). When types are all
homogeneous, that is, b1 = ... = bt = b, we have a(b) = ab.
T       1 Suppose that 2(c/3)
3/2 > a(b) > 0. Then, there exists an m∗ such that for all
m−replica games with m ≥ m∗, there are exactly two interior pure strategy Nash equilibria. These
pure strategy Nash equilibria are such that, for all players i of type τ, the strategies (si,ki) converge
to (s∗
τ(i),k∗
τ(i)) as m goes to inﬁnity, where s∗
τ(i) = bτ(i)s, k∗
τ(i) = bτ(i)k, and (s,k) are positive
solutions to:  
s = a(b)k2
k[c − a(b)s] = 1
. (6)
In words, when a(b) is small enough compared to the infra-marginal cost for a productive
investment, the system of two equations (6) with two unknowns has exactly two positive solutions.
As m gets large, each such solution gets arbitrarily close to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of
the corresponding m−replica game. We get two approximate Nash equilibria. Besides, as m gets
large, every pure strategy Nash equilibrium gets arbitrarily close to a solution of (6).
A complete proof is derived in the appendix. But we now provide a sketch of the proof in order
to get a basic understanding of the result. Let G(s) = [gij(s)]i,j∈N and diag(G(s)) be matrix with
However, adopting a model with a continuum of players would make it more complicated for readers to link our
approach to the one used in the network literature. That would obscure an important point of the paper linking
network formation to network use.
9diagonal terms gii (s) and zero oﬀ-diagonal terms. Then, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to
k is
[cI−aG(s)]   k + adiag(G(s)) k = b. (7)
Observe that the term with diag(G(s)) appears in (7) because we allow for self-loops (when i = j)
in gij(s). The matrix [cI−aG(s)] can be shown (Debreu and Hernstein 1953) to be invertible and
















. The ﬁrst order conditions for s are:
si = aki
s   k
ns
− asiki









(ns)2,i = 1,...,n. (8)
where s   k =
 n
j=1 sjkj. Since c > as2/s (which is necessary for λa/c(s) to be well deﬁned), si is
bounded in the limit for large n. Since s is bounded, one can see from (7) that k must also be
bounded. And hence as the number of individuals for all types go to inﬁnity we have that in the
limit (8) becomes:
si = aki
s   k
ns
, for all i = 1,...,n. (9)
since the terms s   k/(ns)2, sik2
i/ns and s2
ik2






since gii(s) = s2
i/
 n
j=1 sj and hence diag(G(s)) vanishes in the limit as n becomes large.
From (9) notice that si/ki is a constant for all types so that one can write si = θis and ki = θik,








and thus (10) can be written as:








Equation (12) implies that for any i, j we must have θi/θj = bi/bj and then, without loss of





7This also allows us to see that we are not focusing on the subset of symmetric equilibria, that is, on equilibria
where individuals of the same type choose the same action. To see this, notice that we can arbitrarily split a type
t ∈ T into two groups: t1 and t2. But if both groups keep the same bt, since the equilibrium action only depends
on bt, their actions will not change. So the commonality of actions is a requirement of all limits of equilibria, not a
consequence of us focusing on symmetric equilibria.




which lead to (6).
The second order conditions are satisﬁed at both equilibria. Since the reasons for why this is
true are related to those for which (and why) equilibria are stable we brieﬂy postpone the discussion,
since we now study the stability of the equilibria described in Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.







for all i = 1,...,mt is not stable.







for all i = 1,...,mt. If in this situation some player j provides a positive
socialization eﬀort, then the marginal revenue of si, for player j  = i, increases by a discrete amount
(which is akikj) even for a small value of sj, while the marginal cost of si is small if si is small. This
result does not rely on the linear quadratic structure but on the fact that beneﬁts and costs have
diﬀerent orders of power. From an economic viewpoint, any socialization eﬀort, however small,
leads to a social interaction that generates synergy payoﬀs when at least one additional agent
socializes as well, which induces every other agent to socialize further.
This does not happen for the two interior equilibria described in Theorem 1. We consider a
gradient dynamical system (see e.g. Corchón and Mas-Colell 1996) for the dynamics of (s(t),k(t))
so that a variable is adjusted in a direction where payoﬀs improve (agents may only be imperfectly
























































































































where A, B and cA are all diagonal matrices with only −1, a(b)k and −c in their diagonal,
respectively. It is now easy to demonstrate that the equations for the eigenvalues have a non-
trivial solution if and only if (λ + 1)(λ + c) − [a(b)k]
2 = 0. This second-order equation in λ has a
discriminant equal to (c − 1)
2 +4[a(b)k]
2 ≥ 0, which always admits two real solutions, denoted λ1
and λ2. Besides
λ1 + λ2 = −(1 + c) < 0,
implying that at least one such solution is negative. Then, both are negative if and only if λ1λ2 =
c − (a(b)k)
2 > 0, equivalent to c − a(b)s > 0, which is true when 2(c/3)
3/2 > a(b). This is the
condition that guarantees that the second order conditions are satisﬁed (see Theorem 1).
In words, the equations in (15) imply that there is no feedback from the changes in one individ-
uals’ strategies to any of the others’ when close to either equilibria. Then, the local dynamics are
entirely driven by one individual’s strategy and thus local stability is the same as local maxima,
which is why the condition for stability is the same than the condition that guarantees that the
second order conditions are satisﬁed.
Given that the partially corner equilibrium is unstable for high enough replications, we concen-
trate on the interior equilibria. Table 1 shows the discrepancy between equilibrium and approxi-
mated equilibrium actions for various population sizes when the population is homogeneous with
common trait b. The last column corresponds to the approximated equilibrium actions; the other
columns give the exact Nash equilibrium actions as m varies.
Table 1: Simulations with a = 2,c = 1,t = 1 and b = 0.1.8
m 2 5 10 20 50 100 500 ∞
Low equilibrium
k∗ 1,898 1,195 1,101 1,065 1,049 1,046 1,046 1,046
s∗ 2,366 815 458 303 234 222 218 219
High equilibrium
k∗ 3,346 4,643 4,591 4,508 4,444 4,420 4,400 4,394
s∗ 3,506 3,923 3,911 3,891 3,875 3,869 3,864 3,862
For an homogeneous population with common trait b, one can verify that the exact equilibrium
equations are:  












8Numbers in the table must be multiplied by 10
−3 to obtain the real equilibrium values.
12Comparing with (6), it can be checked that the approximation error is of the order of m−3/2. In
particular, when m = 100, the approximation error is of the order 10−3.
The approximated equilibria (s∗,k∗) characterized in Theorem 1 display three important fea-
tures.





j, for all i,j. Given our quadratic cost structure, this is equivalent to having
a marginal rate of substitution of socialization versus investment for gross beneﬁts uniform across
all players. An approximate equilibrium is thus fully characterized by specifying the value of this
ratio together with the population proﬁle of productive investments.
Second, diﬀerences in productive investments reﬂect diﬀerences in idiosyncratic traits. More
precisely, k∗
i/k∗
j = bτ(i)/bτ(j), for all i,j. Indeed, absent of any synergy payoﬀs, private returns are
maximal when productive investment is equal to bτ(i)/c, and the ratio of these maximal investments
is then also equal to bτ(i)/bτ(j). At an approximate equilibrium, the relative value of productive
investments thus remains unchanged with and without synergies. The presence of synergies only
aﬀects the absolute value of those investments.
Third, in the presence of synergies, productive investments are all scaled up (compared to the
case without synergies) by a synergistic multiplier.9 This multiplier, which is homogeneous across
all players, is a decreasing function of the infra-marginal productive investment cost c, and an
increasing function of the second-order average type a(b). Beyond this dependence on exogenous
payoﬀ parameters, the synergistic multiplier also depends on the endogenous baseline equilibrium
socialization eﬀort s∗.
In substance, individual traits enter multiplicatively into own actions at approximate equilibria.
Also, the population-wide heterogeneity collapses into a single index, a(b). Compared with the case
without synergies, productive investments are all scaled up by a common synergistic multiplier that
depends on this index. Finally, the ratio of socialization to productive eﬀort is uniform across all
agents.
These properties of the equilibrium actions have implications for the type composition of the
social interaction circle of each player. Recall that s∗
i gives the total interaction intensity, or size, of
the social circle of agent i. We deduce from the above discussion that social circles across players
of diﬀerent types τ and τ′ vary in ﬁxed proportions bτ/bτ′. Beyond this size eﬀect, the inner
composition of social circles is the same for all agents. More precisely, every agent i devotes an
identical fraction bτ′/
 
τ∈T bτ of his total socialization intensity to interacting with type τ′ agents,
and this fraction is independent of his own type.
Figure 1 plots equations (6).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
9The multiplier is, precisely, 1/(1 − a(b)s




∗ = bτ(i)/(c − a(b)s
∗), and by dividing the right-hand term by the optimal productive investment level in the
absence of synergies, bτ(i)/c.
13From the graph, it is clear that the system (6) need not always have a non-negative solution.
The upper bound on a(b) in Theorem 1 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the two graphs to
cross in the positive orthant of the space (s,k). When a(b) is too large, the synergistic multiplier
operates too intensively and there is no intersection. More precisely, holding s ﬁxed, the level of
productive investments escalates without bound. In turn, this triggers and unbounded increase in
socialization eﬀort, and both eﬀects positively feed back into each other.
R      1 When 0 < a(b) < 2(c/3)
3/2, the system of equations (6) has two diﬀerent non-negative
solutions. When a(b) = 2(c/3)







When a(b) > 2(c/3)
3/2, there is no non-negative solution.
One slightly artiﬁcial feature of the model is the fact that the eﬀort variables are unbounded.
This creates existence problems and generates the need for the assumption a(b) < 2(c/3)
3/2. In
addition, this generates a failure of upper-hemicontinuity in the equilibrium correspondence as the
high-action equilibrium diverges to inﬁnity as a(b) goes to zero. A simple way to deal with this
problem is to assume that the eﬀort of each individual is bounded. That is, si + ki ≤ T. This
is natural when one interprets this eﬀort as an activity that consumes resources. It is relatively
easy to characterize the equilibria in this case. In particular, the Pareto superior equilibrium (see
below) disappears for a(b)T low enough. A bounded strategy space can also introduce upper corner
equilibria which may be stable.
3.2 Welfare
Given an approximate equilibrium (s∗,k∗), we denote by u(s∗,k∗) = (u1 (s∗,k∗),...,um(s∗,k∗))




outcome, i.e., the one (almost) maximizing the sum of payoﬀs for all players in a large m−replica
game.
The next result compares equilibrium actions and payoﬀs across the two approximate equilibria
characterized in Theorem 1.10
P           2 Assume 0 < a(b) < 2(c/3)
3/2 and let (s∗,k∗) and (s∗∗,k∗∗) be the two diﬀer-
ent approximate equilibria of an m−replica game. Then, without loss of generality, (s∗,k∗) ≥
 
sE,kE 
≥ (s∗∗,k∗∗) and u
 
sE,kE 
≥ u(s∗,k∗) ≥ u(s∗∗,k∗∗), where ≥ is the component-wise
ordering.
10Notice that all the claims to follow are made on approximate equilibria rather than on the exact Nash equilibria
of the game. Given the local continuity of the equilibrium correspondence around interior equilibria, the claims about
approximate equilibria are generally portable to properties of Nash equilibria, although some qualiﬁcations may be
sometimes required.
14In words, the equilibrium actions are ranked component-wisely and the equilibrium payoﬀs are
Pareto-ranked accordingly. From now on, we refer to the Pareto-superior and to the Pareto-inferior
approximate equilibrium as the high and the low equilibrium, respectively. The socially eﬃcient
outcome lies in between the two equilibria, so that we can eﬀectively talk about a too-high and a
too-low equilibrium. To get an intuition for why the eﬃcient outcome lies in between the equilibria,
note that the ﬁrst order conditions for eﬃciency in the limit economy look as follows:
 
s = 2a(b)k2
k[c − 2a(b)s] = 1
(16)
These conditions are as in (6) but with 2a(b) replacing a(b), as a result of the externalities caused
by agents’ actions of others they do not take into account when maximizing their own welfare. But
proposition 3 shows that an increase in a(b) leads to new equilibria where the new high equilibrium
is below the earlier one, and the low equilibrium is above the previous one. Hence, the solutions to
(16) will lie in between equilibrium solution. Of those solutions the welfare maximizer will be the
higher one for reasons that are analogous to why the high equilibrium has a higher welfare than
the low equilibrium.
If we go back to our example on education, then this means that, compared to the socially
eﬃcient outcome, there is an equilibrium where parents put too much eﬀort in socializing and
educating their children and another one where they exert too little eﬀort. This is due to local
complementarities and positive synergies so that the too-high (too-low) equilibrium is reached
because parents, who are obsessed with (not interested in) the education of their kids, meet other
obsessed (non-interested) parents, which, in turn, make parents even more obsessed (uninterested),
triggering even more (less) productive eﬀorts on both side.
Denote by (s∗,k∗) and (s∗∗,k∗∗) the baseline socialization and productive eﬀorts that solve
(6), and that enter the calculation of the high and the low equilibrium, respectively. Then, it is
already apparent from Figure 1 that s∗/k∗ ≥ s∗∗/k∗∗. That is, the level of socialization per unit
of productive investment is higher at the high equilibrium. At the high equilibrium, a high joint
socialization eﬀort creates tight links across players who then invest heavily in productive eﬀort
to build high cross synergies on this fertile ground. At the low equilibrium, low joint socialization
eﬀorts lead to a loose interaction pattern which hampers the scope for cross synergies, and thus
the level of private investments. As a matter of fact, the synergistic multiplier is higher in the high
equilibrium, and pulls up the level of production investments compared to the low equilibrium.
The equilibrium multiplicity identiﬁed in Theorem 1 reﬂects an inter-twinned coordination
problem in the socialization process and in the production technology. These two coordination
problems are rooted separately on the payoﬀs strategic complementarity both in socialization eﬀort
and in productive investment. The dependence of the cross returns in production on the population
socialization proﬁle, ∂2ui(s,k)/∂ki∂kj = agij(s) for i  = j, relates these two coordination problems
with each other, as reﬂected by the endogenous dependence of the synergistic multiplier on the
15baseline socialization eﬀort.
To sum up, we have characterized the set of equilibria for the model when a suﬃciently large
number of agents participates in the game. We have shown that there are two stable interior
equilibria and one unstable corner equilibrium (without socialization). Existence and stability of
interior equilibria are obtained when the level of cross synergies, as well as the heterogeneity in
individual traits, are not too large. This amounts to bounding from above a compound index of
both kinds of payoﬀ parameters. In the absence of that bound, the complementarities inherent to
the model would make equilibrium values of the variables to diverge. Finally, we have shown that
the stable equilibria are Pareto-ranked, and that the socially eﬃcient outcome lies in between the
stable equilibria.
4 Comparative statics analysis and empirical implications






τ=1 bτ, that measures the population heterogeneity in private returns to
productive investment. This compound index directly enters in the equilibrium behavior (6) and,
in particular, in the value of the synergistic multiplier.
Exogenous changes in the value of the technological parameter and/or in the group character-
istics have an impact on socialization and investment that is channeled through the variations in
a(b) that follow these changes. The next result clariﬁes how socialization and investment react to
changes in a(b).
P           3 Suppose that a(b) increases. Then, in both approximate equilibria of the replica
game, the percentage change in socialization eﬀort is higher than that of productive investment
for all agents. Besides, the baseline equilibrium actions that solve (6) both increase at the low
equilibrium and decrease at the high equilibrium.
Recall that equilibrium actions are multiplicative in own traits, (s∗
i,k∗
i) = bτ(i) (s∗,k∗), where
(s∗,k∗) are the baseline socialization and productive investments that solve (6). Proposition 3
implies that the socialization eﬀort per unit of productive investment, s∗
i/k∗
i, decreases at the high
equilibrium and increases at the low equilibrium when a(b) goes up. It also states that the elasticity
of socialization with respect to productive investment, that accounts for the relative variation of
these two actions, is smaller than one at all equilibria.
At the high equilibrium, where socialization is overwhelming, agents substitute an increase in
a(b) by an endogenous decrease in baseline socialization s∗. As a result, the synergistic multiplier
decreases and the baseline productive investment is pulled down. This decrease in production feeds
back and further dampens the level of socialization. And so forth, until this chain of cross inﬂuences
sets at a new equilibrium. It turns out that socialization is more responsive than productive
investment.
16At the low equilibrium, instead, where the interaction pattern is diﬀuse, agents complement
an increase in a(b) by an increase in socialization, which triggers an upwards jump in baseline
productive investment. Again, socialization is here more responsive than productive investment.
The reason for this over-responsiveness of socialization can be better understood by remember-













but inspecting the ﬁrst order condition for socialization we see that
lns = lna(b) + 2lnk
and hence
η =





In words, the result arises because the marginal beneﬁt of socialization is a function of k2,
whereas the marginal cost is a function of s. This result, as we discuss in more detail in section 5,
has interesting and novel empirical implications.
Figure 2 illustrates how, at the low equilibrium, an increase in a(b) leads to an increase in
both socialization and investment. At the high equilibrium, instead, baseline socialization and
investment decrease.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Changes in the compound index a(b) can subsume various eﬀects of very diﬀerent nature. More
precisely, this compound index responds positively to upwards shifts in the technological scale of





τ=1 bτ, and to combination of both eﬀects.
For instance, a mean-preserving spread in idiosyncratic traits leaves
 t
τ=1 bτ constant while
 t
τ=1 b2
τ grows. The ensuing upwards shift in the second-order average type increases a(b).
Suppose also that a and all the bτ’s a are all scaled up by a common factor. In particular,
consider the following variation of payoﬀs (4), where λ > 0:












The game with payoﬀs (17) has the same equilibria than the game with original payoﬀs (4), where
the types bτ and the synergy scale parameter a, and thus the compound index a(b), are all scaled
homothetically by 1/λ.
Proposition 3 encompasses all those cases and many others, and pins down the relative variation
of socialization and productive investment, and the absolute variation of baseline socialization and
productive investment, for all these multifarious changes in parameters.
17Notice, however, that equilibrium actions (s∗
i,k∗
i) = bτ(i) (s∗,k∗) need not move in the same
direction than baseline equilibrium actions (s∗,k∗). This may be so at the low equilibrium when
the changes in a(b) result from variations in parameter values for which bτ(i) moves in the opposite
direction than a(b), and at the high equilibrium if bτ(i) moves in the same direction than a(b).
The following result clariﬁes this point.
C         1 An increase in a(b) for which bτ does not decrease (resp. does not increase) in-
creases (resp. decreases) the socialization and investment eﬀorts of all type τ players at the low
equilibrium (resp. at the high equilibrium).
We now document the comparative statics of individual and aggregate equilibrium payoﬀs when
a(b) varies, with a particular emphasis on the eﬀect of the group heterogeneity.
When m gets large, approximate equilibrium payoﬀs corresponding to baseline eﬀorts (s∗,k∗)











k∗ + o(1), for all i = 1,...,mt. (18)
Given the expression for equilibrium payoﬀs (18), the comparative statics of equilibrium actions
established in Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 above have straight implications for the reaction of
individual well-being to changes in the compound index a(b).
P           4 An increase in a(b) for which bτ does not decrease (resp. does not increase)
increases the low equilibrium payoﬀs (resp. decreases the high equilibrium payoﬀs) of all type τ
players.
In particular, an increase in the synergy parameter a induces a downwards shift of equilibrium
payoﬀs at the high equilibrium, and an upwards shift at the low equilibrium. Indeed, scaling
up the scope for synergies helps alleviating the coordination features of both equilibria. At the
low equilibrium, characterized by an under-provision of production and socialization eﬀorts, the
interaction pattern is tightened and investments increment. At the high equilibrium, instead, where
over-provision prevails, the social network is loosened and investments reduced.
Proposition 4 also documents the changes in individual welfare following a change in the pop-
ulation distribution of types. We explore some changes in the types proﬁle b = (b1,...,bt) that
induce an increase in a(b).
Consider two type proﬁles b′ ≥ b, where ≥ is the component-wise ordering. The marginal
private returns to productive investment of every agent are not smaller under b′ than under b,
and are strictly higher for at least one type when b′  = b. Even though b′ is obtained from b
by increasing the type of some agents, it is not always true that the value of a(b′) so obtained is
higher than that of a(b). The following results clarify this point.
Recall that 0 < b1 ≤ b2 ≤ ... ≤ bt.
18P           5 Let b = (b1,...,bt) be a type proﬁle such that 2b1 ≥ bt. Then for all τ ∈ T,
τ  = τ (i), ∂u∗∗
i /∂bτ > 0 (i.e. the low equilibrium payoﬀs of every player increase with bτ), while
∂u∗
i/∂bτ < 0 (the high equilibrium payoﬀs decrease with bτ).11
Recall that, at equilibrium, all agents have the same distribution of types in their social circle,
and interactions with a type τ represent a fraction bτ/
 
τ′∈T bτ′ of the agent’s total socialization
intensity. When 2b1 ≥ bt, the ratio of higher to lower type values is never higher than two. As a
result, the type composition of agent’s social circles are moderately uneven, and high types are not
over-represented with respect to lower types.
With a moderately uneven type distribution, agents of diﬀerent types contribute in not too
disparate proportions to the creation of cross-synergies.
More precisely, the synergistic payoﬀ to a bilateral interaction between players i and j is






τ∈T bτs∗. Holding the




j) the creation of
the synergy payoﬀs. Relative contributions to the synergy are thus equal to b2
τ(i)/b2
τ(j). Two inter-
acting players with identical type contribute symmetrically to the cross spillover they exert on each
other, while two interacting players with diﬀerent type contribute asymmetrically. When 2b1 ≥ bt,
these asymmetric contributions are not too strikingly diﬀerent, with values in [1/4,4], and cross
spillovers are moderately asymmetric.
With moderately asymmetric cross spillovers, any type value unilateral increase beneﬁts all
players at the low equilibrium who each increase the spillovers they exert to every other interacting
partner.
Instead, when type values diﬀer drastically with each other, players’ contributions to the
spillovers with players of a diﬀerent type are highly asymmetric. An increase in the low type
value can now decrease the welfare of high type players at the low equilibrium, as illustrated below.




b2. Then, a(b) is a strictly
decreasing function of the low type b1.12 An increase in b1 decreases the payoﬀs of the high type





b2, the fraction of type 2 players in every individual social circle is bounded
from below by 1/
√
2, a lower bound of roughly 70.7% interactions with type 2 players. In particular,
high type 2 players interact overwhelmingly with players of the same type. This in-breeding bias
is accompanied by symmetric cross-spillovers across high type players to which they all contribute
intensively. High type players also contribute asymmetrically to spillovers they exert on low type








τ′, for all τ ∈ T.
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19players. But the interactions sustaining these spillovers are rare, and they main concern is the
creation of within-type symmetric spillovers.
Suppose now that the value of b1 increases. The asymmetric high-low type interactions become
more prevalent. A higher share of the socialization and production eﬀorts of high type players is now
beneﬁcial to low type players, who partially free-ride on these spillovers to which they themselves
don’t contribute much. High type players then react to this increase in b1 by narrowing down the
size of their social circles at the low equilibrium and, more generally, by decreasing the generation
of cross-spillovers that they now share symmetrically among themselves in a smaller proportion.
The previous results characterize the eﬀect on individual payoﬀs of changes in type composition.
Now following a mean preserving eﬀect in types, the compound index a(b) increases. This induces
an upward shift of baseline actions at the low equilibrium. Individuals experiencing an increase
in type will certainly experience an increase in payoﬀs, but the eﬀect is ambiguous for agents
experiencing a decrease in types. The next result shows, however, that the overall aggregate eﬀect
is positive. The argument is symmetric at the high equilibrium.
P           6 Aggregate payoﬀs increase at the low equilibrium and decrease at the high equilib-
rium following a mean-preserving spread of the population type proﬁle b = (b1,...,bt).13
5 Empirical implications in terms of education
Let us now go back to our example in terms of education where each parent i exerts two types
of costly eﬀort: productive eﬀort ki with the child and socialization eﬀort si related to education.
This interpretation of the model makes the empirical predictions more precise. We ﬁnd that:
(i) Better educated parents exert more productive eﬀort educating their kids than low-educated
parents, i.e. ki and bi are positively related (Proposition 3). This fact is well-documented. For
example, for England, using the National Child Development Study, Patacchini and Zenou (2010)
ﬁnd that more educated parents put more eﬀort in educating their children than less educated
parents. More precisely, they ﬁnd that around 70 percent of educated parents are highly interested
in their child education (measured by the frequency they read to their child) while it is roughly 30
percent for less educated parents.
(ii) Better educated parents are more prone to socialize with other parents than low-educated
parents, i.e. si and bi are positively related (Proposition 3). There is also empirical evidence on
this issue. Putman (1995) documents that less educated people are less engaged in the life of
their communities, in particular, group membership. Moreover, using data from the US General
Social Survey (GSS) from 1972 through 1996 and from the DDB-Needham Life Style survey data
from 1975 through 1997, Helliwell and Putnam (2007) investigate the eﬀects of education on trust
and social engagement, two key variables often used as measures of social capital. They ﬁnd, in
13That leaves
￿t





20particular, that higher-educated parents are more likely to participate socially in school activities
than low-educated parents.14
(iii) Our model has multiple equilibria. This feature (Theorem 1) can help to explain why, in
diﬀerent locales, children whose parents have similar characteristics (e.g. income, education level)
or are similarly talented as other children (say, measured by I.Q.) end up having very diﬀerent
educational outcomes or diﬀerent levels of parental educational eﬀorts. Glaeser et al (1996) make
a similar observation about crime. Their argument runs as follows. If one compares diﬀerent
neighborhoods with the same fundamentals (in terms of unemployment rate, poverty and so on),
one observes that crime rates are very diﬀerent. Social interactions, which are usually not observed
by the econometrician, can explain these diﬀerences. The same argument can be used to test
whether social interactions between parents with the same education levels can explain diﬀerent
educational outcomes of children.
(iv) Diﬀerent levels of parental education aﬀect (positively or negatively) proportionally more
the socialization eﬀort of those parents si than their direct eﬀort ki with children (Proposition 3).
This is an interesting prediction that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been yet tested.
An important question is then how an exogenous change in the returns to production and
socialization aﬀect the relative production and socialization eﬀorts at equilibrium. In turns out
that, when the returns increase because either all bi increase or a does, all equilibrium actions
decrease at the Pareto-superior equilibrium, while they increase at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium.
In both cases, the percentage change in socialization eﬀort is higher (in absolute value) than that
of the productive eﬀort.
To sum up, in this section we have shown that the comparative statics for the model are very
tightly connected to the parameter a(b). This allows us, for example, to relate the variations in
equilibria with changes in the strength of incentives, or with relative population heterogeneity. We
have also shown that socialization is more responsive than production to exogenous shocks in the
parameters. Finally, we have explored some empirical implications of the model. Some are well
established, and some are novel.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we provide a simple operational model of network formation with productive ef-
fort, synergies and population heterogeneity. An innovation of our study is that socializing is not
equivalent to elaborating a nominal list of intended relationships, as in the literature on network
formation. In other words, network formation does not result of an earmarked socialization process.
This shortcut greatly improves the tractability of the model and allows us to perform a standard
14See also Dee (2004) and Milligan et al. (2004), which use instrumental variables to estimate the eﬀects of own
education. The results show that individuals with more education tend to be more engaged citizens.
21type of equilibrium analysis that equates marginal costs and beneﬁts of both production and so-
cialization.15 We obtain welfare predictions and clear-cut comparative statics. In substance, we
identify a “too cold” and a “too hot” equilibrium. We show that socialization is more responsive
than production to exogenous shocks in the parameters. We also demonstrate that our analysis is
robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations generalizing the model.
As all models, ours relies on speciﬁc assumptions due to the functional form of payoﬀs given in
equation (4). The three main characteristics of this functional form are:
(a) the linear-quadratic returns to productive investment,
(b) aggregate constant returns to scale in socialization eﬀort (condition (A2) in lemma 1),
(c) the generic socialization eﬀort (condition (A3) in Lemma 1),
Combining the linear equilibrium equations for productive investment with conditions (A2) and
(A3), Nash equilibrium conditions (both for productive investments and for socialization eﬀorts)
take a relatively manageable closed-form matrix expression. In turn, when the population gets
large, and because we are able to control the population size eﬀect in our matrix closed-form
expression, approximate equilibrium conditions boil down to a simple system of equations (6).
Our results (in terms of characterization of equilibria, multiple equilibria, welfare and compar-
ative statics results) are robust to certain extensions of the model,16 that we discuss now.
(a) Linear-quadratic production payoﬀs give rise to linear equilibrium conditions for the levels of
productive investment. Linear equilibrium conditions for productive investment play an important
role in the analysis, as they allow to express existence and interiority of the productive investment
decisions (for a given socialization proﬁle s) as a a function of the spectral radius of the matrix of
link intensities G(s) = [gij (s)]. However, it is important to stress that linear-quadratic payoﬀs are
not a necessary condition for equilibrium equations to be linear.17 Indeed, equilibrium analysis boils
down to solving a so-called linear complementarity problem for a relatively broad class of payoﬀ
function, beyond the particular linear-quadratic speciﬁcation. Ballester and Calvó-Armengol (2010)
provide examples of these payoﬀ functions. Our analysis would carry over to any such environment.
By considering non-quadratic cost structures, we can show that our analysis is robust to (at least
some form of) non-linearities in these equilibrium conditions.
15Because of its simplicity and ﬂexibility, our model could be used to analyze diﬀerent outcomes where social
interactions matter. A recent paper by Galeotti and Merlino (2009) uses our network formation process to analyze
social interactions and job search. They ﬁnd interesting results that are empirical relevant. Golub and Livne (2010)
also use a similar approach (i.e. network formation is not the result of an earmarked socialization process) to analyze
the characteristics of equilibrium networks.
16All detailed proofs of these robustness results are available upon request.
17For example, in the model of public goods in networks by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), the best-reply functions
are linear, even though they use a general utility function and not a linear-quadratic one. For an interesting discussion
on this issue, see Bramoullé et al. (2009).
22(b) Condition (A2) is mainly chosen for its operationally virtues. We can accommodate varia-
tions of this condition, and thus alternative expressions for the link intensities gij(s) that allow for
some aggregate scale eﬀects in socialization. For example, instead of constant aggregate returns
to scale, we can adopt non-constant returns to scale (i.e. increasing or decreasing) and show that
most of our results still hold.
(c) On top of its operational virtues, condition (A3) embodies the central assumption of our
approach, the genericity of socialization eﬀorts, not earmarked to particular targets. We can extend
condition (A3) by, for example, introducing productivity bi in the link formation process so that
the ratio gji(s)/gki(s) is not only a function of sj/sk but also of bj/bk. Again, in this extension,
our main results are still valid.
Our model has, however, some limits. For example, if we consider a model where there is no
congestion in social interactions, i.e. gij(s) = sisj, then the analysis becomes very diﬃcult. Indeed,
when there is no congestion in the socialization process, then for large population n, the condition
on invertibility of the socialization matrix M will not be satisﬁed. This is because, when there is no
congestion, beneﬁts from socialization explode when n is large. There are, in a sense, “too many”
synergies from friends.
We have also illustrated our model in terms of parental involvement in education and derive
interesting empirical predictions. We ﬁnd, in particular, that high-educated parents tend to par-
ticipate more in social activities related to schools (like e.g. parental evenings) than low-educated
parents and that diﬀerent levels of parental education aﬀect (positively or negatively) proportionally
more the socialization of those parents than their direct eﬀort with their children.
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25Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Fix s. Combining (A1) and (A3) gives skgij(s) = sjgik(s). Summing
across all j’s and using (A2) gives gik(s) = sisk/
 n
j=1 sj.
Proof of Lemma 2: The equilibrium analysis is clear.
Proof of Theorem 1: It follows from the following Lemmata 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Consider an m−replica game involving n = mt players, where m ≥ 1 is ﬁxed for the time being.
Let G(s) = [gij(s)]i,j∈N be the n−symmetric adjacency matrix for the network with link inten-
sities in (1).
For all α ≥ 0 and for all x ∈ Rn
+, deﬁne x =
 n







We extend this deﬁnition to any non-negative vector in an Euclidean space of arbitrary ﬁnite size.
L     3 Let s∈ Rn
+, s = 0 and α ≥ 0 such that 1 > αs2/s. Then, M(s)= [I−αG(s)]
−1 is a
well-deﬁned and non-negative n−square matrix, equal to M(s)= I + λα(s)G(s).
Proof. When M(s) ∈ Rn2
is well-deﬁned, we have M(s) =
 +∞
p=0 αpG(s)p. We compute G(s)p.

















gij, for all i,j = 1,...,n















G = I + λα(s)G(s).
We know from Debreu and Herstein (1953) that M(s) is well-deﬁned and non-negative if and
only if 1 > αρ(G(s)), where ρ(G(s)) is the modulus of the largest eigenvalue of G(s) (see also
Theorem 1 in Ballester et al. 2006). Let us show that ρ(G(s)) = s2/s.
First, note that s2/s is an eigenvalue of G for the eigenvector s. Indeed, G   s= (s2/s)s.
Second, let x such that  x  = 1. We have:
G   x =
s   x
ns
s,
where s   x =
 n
i=1 sixi is the scalar product, with |s   x| ≤  s ×  x  ≤  s . Therefore,  G   x  ≤
 s 
2 /ns = s2/s. Note that, by deﬁnition, ρ(G) = sup { G   x / x  :  x  = 1}. Altogether, we
can conclude that ρ(G) = s2/s.
26Let now m1,m2,m3,... be an increasing sequence of integers such that mh → +∞ as h → +∞.
Each h ∈ N deﬁnes a mh−replica game involving nh = mht players. In the mh−replica game,






+ . Given a player i = 1,...,nh, recall that bτ(i) denotes his type, where τ (i) ∈ T.
L     4 Let
  
sh,kh   
h∈N be a sequence of Nash equilibria of the mh−replica games such that
c > ash2/sh, for all h ∈ N. Suppose that the system of equations:
 
[c − a(b)s]k = 1
s = a(b)k2 (19)
has a solution (s,k) ∈ R2
+ such that c > a(b)s. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists some hε ∈ N such
that, for all h ≥ hε, we have max{
   kh
i − bτ(i)k
   ,
   sh
i − bτ(i)s
   } < ε, for all i = 1,...,nh, where (s,k)
is a solution to (19).
Proof. Let
  
kh,sh   






be the diagonal matrix with diagonal terms gii
 
sh 
and zero oﬀ-diagonal terms. For
each h, the ﬁrst-order necessary equilibrium conditions for kh are:







 kh = bh.
Using the expression for [I − αG(sh)]
−1 ∈ Rnh2
in Lemma 3 and letting α = a/c, we rewrite this




















where bh ∈ Rnh
+ is deﬁned by bh
i = bτ(i), for all i = 1,...,nh. In words, the ith coordinate of bh
corresponds to the private returns of player i’s type. Note that the nh coordinates of bh take t
diﬀerent possible values, b1,...,bt, each repeated mh times.
We also compute the ﬁrst-order necessary equilibrium conditions for sh

















(nhsh)2,i = 1,...,nh. (21)
Given that c > ash2/sh, for all h and that nh → +∞ as h → +∞, necessarily, sh
i ∈ O(1),18




, p > 0, for some j. Let then




, p ≥ q ≥ 0, for all i. Then, ash2/sh ∈ O(nhp
), and the inequality
c > ash2/sh is violated for large enough h.
18f(h) = O(g(h)) if and only if ∃M > 0, ∃ h0 > 0 such that ∀h > h0, we have 0 ≤ f(h) < M g(h). In other words,
f(h) = O(g(h)) means that g(h) bounds f(h) from above (for large h) up to a constant.
27Given that sh










∈ o(1)19 when h → +∞, for all
i,j = 1,...,nh
The ﬁrst-order conditions (20) imply that kh
i ∈ O(1), for all i = 1,...,nh and for all h.





nhsh + o(1), for all i = 1,...,nh and for all h. (22)
By (20), kh
i is a continuous function of sh. Therefore, sh
i = σh
i + o(1) and kh
i = κh
i + o(1), for
















nhσh ,i = 1,...,nh. (24)
We solve for (23) and (24).




j, for all i,j. Without any loss of generality,
we can thus write σh
i = θh
i s and κh
i = θh










































i ,i = 1,...,nh.










and hence, w.l.o.g. θh
i = bh
i . Then, (26) becomes:
ck = 1 +
asb2




19f(h) = o(g(h)) if and only if ∀M > 0, ∃ h0 > 0 such that ∀h > h0, we have 0 ≤ f(h) < M g(h). In other words,





while (25) becomes s = a(b)k2.
Finally, note that the condition c > ash2/sh is then equivalent to c > a(b)s.
L     5 If 2(c/3)
3/2 > a(b), then the system of equations (19) has exactly two solutions (s,k) ∈
R2
+ such that c > a(b)s.
Proof. Plugging the expression for k into the expression for s in (19), one concludes that every





We establish conditions such that the graph of g(s) crosses (twice) the 45 degree line for some
s such that c > a(b)s. Note that g(0) = a(b)/c2 and lims↑c/a(b) g(s) = +∞, so that the function





Therefore, g′ (0) = 2a(b)2/c3 and lims↑c/a(b)g′ (s) = +∞. If there exists a tangent to the graph
of g( ) on [0,c/a(b)) which is parallel to the 45 degree line, and if this tangent is strictly below
(resp. tangent to) the 45 degree line, the system (19) has exactly two solutions (resp. one solution)
on [0,c/a(b)). Such a tangent exists if 2a(b)2 ≤ c3, equivalent to a(b) ≤ 2−1/2c3/2.
Next, we solve:
g′(x∗) = 1 ⇔ a(b)x∗ = c − 21/3a(b)2/3 (28)
Thus, (19) has two solutions (resp. one solution) if and only if a(b) ≤ 2−1/2c3/2 and g(x∗) < x∗








g(x∗) < x∗ ⇔ a(b) < 2c3/2/3
√
3.
The overall condition is thus a(b) < c3/2 min{2/3
√
3,2−1/2}. However, it is readily checked that
2/3
√




3). When a(b) < 2(c/3)
3/2 (resp. a(b) =
2(c/3)
3/2), the graph of g( ) thus crosses the 45 degree line twice (resp. once) on [0,c/a(b)).
29L     6 Let
  
sh∗,kh∗   
h∈N be such that sh∗
i = sbτ(i) and kh∗
i = kbτ(i), for all i = 1,...,nh,
where (s,k) is some given solution to (19). If 2(c/3)
3/2 > a(b), then there exists some h ∈ N such




Proof. First note that Lemma 5 implies that (19) has a solution such that c > a(b)k. Consider
this solution. We also know from Lemma 4 that both kh
i ,sh
i ∈ O(1), for all i = 1,...,nh. We now



























































































































= o(1) + ak
b2
b
























o(1) − 1 o(1) + a(b)k
o(1) + a(b)k −c
 
have alternating signs.
But the determinant of a matrix is a continuous (polynomial) function of the matrix entries.
Given that (31) and (33), are negative, when h → +∞, we are thus left to check that the sign of
30the determinant is positive, that is, c − a(b)2k2 > 0, which is equivalent to c − a(b)s > 0, which
Lemma 5 shows is true when 2(c/3)
3/2 > a(b).
Proof of Proposition 1: Let ǫ > 0. Take h large enough such that Theorem 1 holds for this













around the equilibrium points.
Let us ﬁrst look at the partially corner equilibrium. By (29) we have that the ﬁrst derivative










Consider a perturbation around the equilibrium sε = (ε1,...,εn), with b = min{b1,...,bn}. Then,






− εi > abib − εi > 0,
for εi small enough. For any small enough perturbation, si would tend to increase for all i, thus
negating stability.




























































































































































The coeﬃcients of the linearized gradient system (36) correspond to the cells of a 2nh × 2nh
matrix Πh   
sh∗,kh∗  

































λ ],i = 1,...,nh where xh
λ and yh
λ
are nh × 1 vectors with coordinates xh
i,λ and yh
i,λ, i = 1,...,nh. The eigenvalue and the eigenvalue
satisfy the following identity: Πhνλ = λνλ, that is:
(λ + 1)xh
i,λ − a(b)kyh
i,λ = 0,i = 1,...,nh
−a(b)kxh
i,λ + (λ + c)yh
i,λ = 0,i = 1,...,nh
These systems have a non-trivial solution if and only if (λ + 1)(λ + c) − (a(b)k)
2 = 0. This
second-order equation has a discriminant equal to (c − 1)
2 +4(a(b)k)
2 ≥ 0. It thus always admits
two real solutions, denoted λ1 and λ2. Besides:
λ1 + λ2 = −(1 + c) < 0,
implying that at least one such solution is negative. Then, both are negative if and only if λ1λ2 =
c − (a(b)k)
2 > 0, equivalent to c − a(b)s > 0, which is true when 2(c/3)
3/2 > a(b).
Summing up, when 2(c/3)
3/2 > a(b) > 0, the matrix Πh has two diﬀerent negative eigenvalues
λ1,λ2 < 0. Each eigenvalue λr,r = 1,2 has an associated eigenspace of dimension nh with gener-
ating eigenvectors [a(b)kih⊺,(λr + 1)ih⊺],i = 1,...,nh where ih is an nh × 1 vector containing a 1
in position i = 1,...,nh and 0’s in the other nh − 1 positions.












i = k∗∗bτ(i), for all i = 1,...,nh, and (s∗,k∗),(s∗∗,k∗∗) are the two
diﬀerent solutions to (6). Suppose that sh∗
i ≥ sh∗∗
i , for some i. Then, necessarily, s∗ ≥ s∗∗. By (6),




i , for all i = 1,...,nh.
To establish the welfare ranking, we ﬁrst use the expression for payoﬀs in (4) and the ﬁrst-order
conditions for kh







ck∗2 − s∗2 
+ o(1), for all i = 1,...,nh.
Next, using the fact that (s∗,k∗) are solutions to (6), we write:

















k∗ + o(1), for all i = 1,...,nh, (42)
and similarly for the approximate equilibrium payoﬀs uh∗∗




by deﬁnition k∗ ≥ k∗∗, the welfare at the equilibrium
 
sh∗,kh∗ 


























































(nhsh)2,i = 1,...,nh. (44)
Notice that conditions (43) and (44) are like (21) and (20) except with 2a rather than a, and
therefore its approximate version is:
 
s = 2a(b)k2
k[c − 2a(b)s] = 1
. (45)
We can thus use the results of proposition elasticity to establish that the (two) solutions of (45) will
lie between the two solution of 6. Since the second order conditions will be satisﬁed (by a reason
analogous to the one in lemma (6), one of those solutions will be the optimal point. Indeed, by
33the reasoning in this same proposition the componentwise higher solution is the optimal one. The
result now follows.
Proof of Propositions 3: Let ǫ > 0. Take h large enough such that Theorem 1 holds for this












are computed with two diﬀerent solutions (s∗,k∗) ≥ (s∗∗.k∗∗) of (19). On the (s,k)





and a downward shift of the graph of:
s = a(b)k2. (47)




while those of the Pareto-superior equilibrium
 
sh∗,kh∗ 
all decrease. The elasticity η that keeps









Diﬀerentiating (46) and (47) with respect to a(b) gives:
∂k
∂a(b)






































k + 2s2 < 1.




τ′ =τ bτ′ ≥ 2
 
τ′ =τ b2
τ′, for all τ ∈ T, a suﬃcient condition for which is 2b1 ≥ bt.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let ǫ > 0. Take h large enough such that Theorem 1 holds for this












are computed with two diﬀerent solutions (s∗,k∗) ≥ (s∗∗,k∗∗) of (6).
34Using (42) and (6), and summing across all players gives the following expression for the pop-































(k**,s**) 11/a(b) 0 a(b)
Figure 2
1/a’(b’) a’(b’)
1
k (production)
s (synergy)
k[1-a(b)s]=  1
s = a(b)k2